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Iain T. Benson

UNEXAMINED FAITHS AND THE
PUBLIC PLACE OF RELIGION:
EMERGING INSIGHTS FROM THE
LAW
Abstract
The article examines certain key terms, such as “beliefs” and “faith” and how these
are understood in relation to the public sphere. It examines some writings of recent
popularist authors such as Richard Dawkins and Christopher Hitchens, and is critical of
the authors’ claims that they do not have faith or beliefs. Drawing on legal decisions in
Canada and South Africa the article suggests that this sort of terminological looseness
has legal and political implications when it comes to whether or not beliefs of all sorts
(religious and non-religious) are treated fairly in the public sphere.
Arguing for a more diverse public sphere, the article cautions that law should give
greater attention to principles of modus vivendi rather than “convergence” in which the
attempt is to eradicate legally allowable positions from the public sphere and place
those who hold them, and their communities, at a disadvantage. The law must not,
by inflating its own role, put added pressures on the liberty that accommodation and
subsidiarity require.

1. INTRODUCTION
The topic of this conference, “Religion, Faith and the Public University” is well
chosen because it asks us to consider why “religion” and “faith” are in relation
to the “public university” and why “religion” and “faith” are listed separately. It
is correct to view religion and faith as different things, though they are often
conflated, because while all human beings necessarily have “faith” not all
people are religious. This seemingly obvious assertion is, however, one that
contains significance for how we discuss religions in relation to the public
sphere including public education at all levels.
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What is the relevance of faith and religion being discussed in relation to a
public university? What is it in the nature of the “public” or how it is currently
viewed as “secular” that suggests there is any tension here? Why is religion
and/or faith viewed as in any kind of tension with the public university once
we have recognized that “faith” (that which we believe in whether scientifically
verifiable or not) is part of all human endeavours including higher education?
These are some of the questions I seek to address in this paper.

2. BELIEF AND FAITH AS NECESSARY ATTRIBUTES
OF ALL CITIZENS WHETHER RELIGIOUS OR NOT
All citizens have beliefs and faith whether or not they are aware what they are.
To act is to assume and that assumption is “faith” though that basic insight
is often unexamined and missed when faith is used as an equivalent term
for “religious belief.”1 Another way of putting this is to note that the question
is not whether people are believers but what they believe in. There is no
good reason to exclude beliefs that come from religious beliefs from access
to public goods (such as funding) in favour of those beliefs that come from
atheist or agnostic beliefs. For it is prejudice related to the sources and kinds
of belief that undergird secularism’s attempt to restructure the public sphere
on a “material” basis. Yet the hidden assumption in the category of “secular”
as it is often used is that somehow religious beliefs are to be stripped out of
the public sphere and other beliefs, therefore, are left in.2
A scholar of an earlier generation who spent a good part of his life teaching
and working in South Africa, philosopher R.F.A. Hoernlé has also noted that:
every bona fide judgment is characterised by belief... [and] if “faith” is firm
belief, conviction of truth, then faith in this context is indistinguishable
from knowledge (Hoernlé 1952:55).

For both Newman and Hoernlé, there was a connection between mental
judgments and belief and human actions. On a practical level no line should

1

2

Newman (1899: 295) recognized that everyone who acts must take matters on
faith and wrote: “Life is for action. If we insist on proofs for everything, we shall
never come to action: to act you must assume, and that assumption is faith.” I have
developed this theme at greater length in Benson (2000:519-549).
I have written of the category of “hidden” and “express” meanings, drawing
upon the work of Owen Barfield, in relation to the “secular” elsewhere (Benson
2002:125–139). See also, the reference to the “materialistic” conceptions at the
basis of English secularism in references to the work of George Jacob Holyoake
referred to elsewhere in this article.
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be drawn between belief and actions in terms of faith and all human beings
necessarily act out of “faith.”
Contemporary atheists such as Richard Dawkins (2007) or Sam Harris
(2005, 2007), however, frequently speak as if they “have no beliefs”: a position
that is nonsensical. The belief that one has no beliefs is, obviously, itself a
belief.
Both writers are not alone on their attack on religion and God from what
they believe to be a “belief-less” position. Christopher Hitchens, another writer
in much the same line has summed up this line of thinking as follows:
And here is the point, about myself and my co-thinkers. Our belief is
not a belief. Our principles are not a faith. We do not rely solely upon
science and reason, because these are necessary rather than sufficient
factors, but we distrust anything that contradicts science or outrages
reason. We may differ on many things, but what we respect is free
inquiry, openmindedness, and the pursuit of ideas for their own sake. We
do not hold our convictions dogmatically (Hitchens 2007:Introduction)
(emphasis added).

To claim as Hitchens does, that his belief is not a belief and that the atheistic
principles he endorses are not a “faith” is bad philosophy but helpful since
it shows rather well how far such thinkers (and they are the intellectual end
of what is a very widely representative popular set of misconceptions) have
come from their own roots. George Jacob Holyoake, after all, writing in the 19th
Century, and the man credited by the Oxford English Dictionary with coining
the term “secularism” recognized the more basic truth of the matter when he
subtitled his important book on secularism a “Confession of Belief” (Holyoake
1896).
As to “facts” and “reason,” well, there again, the new atheists don’t really
understand what they are writing about. Hitchens cannot prove that God does
not exist: he simply takes it as an item of his atheistic faith that God does not.
Similarly all the other claims of religion that Hitchens derides. We can say to
him: “What, you believe that everything arose from nothing? How can you
prove this?” Science can never prove something came from nothing because
it cannot measure a change from nothingness to somethingness.
So atheists are men and women of faith in many ways just like the rest
of us. Their dogmas are different but they are dogmatic (in that their beliefs
emerge from the first principles of their faiths). True, in many things their faiths
are different but they are still faiths and their beliefs are still beliefs no matter
how much Hitchens and those like him wish it was different. Humans are
stuck being believers and that is all there is to it. Being dogmatic does not
necessarily mean being rude and it certainly does not equate to understanding
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what dogma is. That is why so many atheists and men and women on the
street, think, like Hitchens, that they don’t believe anything: but they do.
An additional insight, relevant here to the observation that human actions
are divided now from recognition that human life is necessarily lived with “faith”
and “beliefs” is provided by philosopher of science (and language) Michael
Polanyi.
Our objectivism, which tolerates no open declaration of faith, has forced
modern beliefs to take on implicit forms....And no one will deny that
those who have mastered the idioms in which these beliefs are entailed
do also reason most ingeniously within these idioms, even while....
they unhesitatingly ignore all that the idiom does not cover (Polanyi
1958:288) (emphasis added).

Perhaps one of the implicit forms or modern “beliefs” is hidden in the idea
of the “religious free secular?” That would fit with what the philosophers
and theologians have suggested. This is the climate in which people so
readily speak and write of themselves being “unbelievers” in a public order
characterized by a religion-free (but not, as I have argued, faith-free) public
sphere. The public sphere, if the writers quoted are correct, is necessarily a
realm of “faith” whether or not such faith draws its inspiration from religious
presuppositions.
More recently, philosopher Thomas Langan has written on the idea and
importance of the category of “natural faith” which is, as it were, a means of
overcoming these dualistic and false constructions to show that everyone is
a believer and necessarily has faith of some sort (Langan 1996; Calcagno &
Langan 2009). Again, we need to recall that not all faiths are religious faiths.

3. THE ROLE OF LAW IN RELATION TO RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM AND THE RISK OF OVER-INFLATING
LAW’S JURISDICTION
Law recognizes many things that it does not create though it may, in careful
ways, regulate in relation to them. Thus, the fact of the family, of liberty itself
and of rights (including religious liberty) is not created by law, they, in a sense,
transcend law and are prior to it. This has been recognized by Francis Lyall in
the following terms:
As a general statement drawn from the common law, liberty is the basic
position in law in Britain. Liberty is not conferred by a legal instrument: it
is the normal condition, and infringements on that liberty can exist only
as allowed by legislation or case law. Interference with the manifestation
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of traditional religious belief is therefore something which has to be
justified in terms of public order or public good (Lyall 2000:253).3

This realization and the concomitant one that law must recognize its limits,
inherent within the ideas of “subsidiarity” and accommodation is currently
being challenged in Canada and elsewhere by the idea that law is larger than
or prior to what I have described as matters that ought to be immune from
complete legal subordination .
Some years ago, a very interesting exchange on this theme occurred
between a leading Canadian judge and American political science professor.
At a conference co-sponsored by the Centre for Cultural Renewal and the
McGill University Department of Religious Studies entitled Pluralism, Public
Policy and Religion, the Canadian Chief Justice presented a paper on the
importance of conscience and religion. In the course of her remarks, the Chief
Justice indicated her thinking at that time with respect to the relationship
between law and the “religious citizen”. Of particular interest to our examination
is how she formulated that relationship:
The modern religious citizen is caught between two all- encompassing
sets of commitments. The law faces the seemingly paradoxical task of
asserting its own ultimate authority while carving out a space within
itself in which individuals and communities can manifest alternative, and
often competing, sets of ultimate commitments (McLachlin (2004:16)
(emphasis added). 4

We need to pay particular attention to the terms “all-encompassing” and
“ultimate” here in relation to the law, as well as the fact that it is the law that
carves out within itself places for what may be “competing sets of ultimate
commitments”. In this conception law is “bigger” than religion. The Chief
Justice then developed this idea as follows:
I wish to call this tension between the rule of law and the claims of
religion a “dialectic of normative commitments”. What is good, true
and just in religion will not always comport with the law’s view of the
matter, nor will society at large always properly respect conscientious
3

4

The seminal decision of Caldwell v. Stuart [1984] 2 S.C.R. 603 stands for the
proposition that a Catholic school board can insist that its Catholic teachers comply
with Church teachings in respect of marriage. The decision not to renew the
contract of a Catholic teacher who had married a divorced man in a civil ceremony,
contrary to Church teaching was upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada. The
right of religion was found by Justice MacIntyre “at large” in the sense that it was
based on the right of religion itself not any piece of legislation or constitutionally
“entrenched right at Confederation.”
This section is taken from Benson (2010:31–34).
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adherence to alternate authorities and divergent normative, or ethical,
commitments. Where this is so, two comprehensive worldviews collide.
It is at this point that the question of law’s treatment of religion becomes
truly exigent. The authority of each is internally unassailable. What
is more, both lay some claim to the whole of human experience. To
which system should the subject adhere? How can the rule of law
accommodate a worldview and ethos that asserts its own superior
authority and unbounded scope? … It is the courts that are most
often faced with this clash and charged with managing this dialectic.
(McLachlin 2004:21–22) (emphasis added).

Law here is viewed, frankly and openly, as a “comprehensive worldview”
capable of competing with and even encompassing religion. Moreover, law is
deemed capable of determining not only what is just but what is “good” and
“true”. It is able to lay claim “to the whole of human experience”.
Whatever else one can say of this, it elevates law to the status of
transcendent determinations and therefore judges to the role of de facto
clerics. It is starkly at variance with earlier decisions of the court that spoke of
its inability to deal with “metaphysical” or “philosophical” matters5 and with the
common law tradition in which liberty, not law, is the primary condition in sharp
contrast to the quotation from Francis Lyall that began this section.
On the other hand, and with respect, the Chief Justice’s formulation tends
towards a monistic or totalistic conception and is quite contrary to that kind
of political pluralism referred to by other scholars, such as William Galston,
in which there is a vision of “social space” and “spheres of autonomy” that
must resile from claims to be a comprehensive good. On this reading, the
Chief Justice’s conception of law asks too much when it views itself as larger
5

Tremblay v. Daigle (1989) 62 DLR (4th) 634 (SCC) at 650, (1989)2 SCR 530. The
case dealt with whether the Quebec Charter provision saying “every human being
has a right to life” provided protection for a third trimester infant en ventre sa mère.
Near the beginning of its unanimous (and unattributed) Reasons, the Supreme
Court of Canada stated:
The Court is not required to enter the philosophical and theological debates about
whether or not a foetus is a person, but, rather, to answer the legal question of
whether the Quebec legislature has accorded the foetus personhood. Metaphysical
arguments may be relevant but they are not the primary focus of inquiry. Nor are
scientific arguments about the biological status of a foetus determinative in our
inquiry. The task of properly classifying a foetus in law and in science are different
pursuits. Ascribing personhood to a foetus in law is a fundamentally normative
task. It results in the recognition of rights and duties – a matter which falls outside
the concerns of scientific classification. In short, this Court’s task is a legal one.
Decisions based upon broad social, political, moral and economic choices are
more appropriately left to the legislature. (Emphasis added.)
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than the religious and other conceptions alongside of which it must operate
as but one of several ordering frameworks within a constitutional democracy
recognizing ordered and interlocking liberties.6
This limitation on the role of law was recognized in her response to the
Chief Justice’s address by the University of Chicago’s Jean Bethke Elshtain,
who replied:
Surely, where the rule of law in the West is concerned, there is a great
deal about which the law is simply silent: the “King’s writ” does not
extend to every nook and cranny. Indeed, a great deal of self-governing
autonomy and authority is not only permitted but is necessary to a
pluralistic, constitutional order characterized by limited government. In
other words, the law need not be defined as total and comprehensive in
the way the Right Honourable Chief Justice claims (Elshtain 2004:36).

That the Chief Justice of the highest court in a country that prides itself on
being open to the “evolutionary” nature of rights jurisprudence could so clearly
subordinate religion to law is a very clear sign of the times and shows yet
another hurdle to the proper characterization of ordered liberties at the heart
of the relationship between religions and the public square. It is not out of
place to suggest, with respect, that further evolution in the law is needed – but
in a direction that respects the historical relationship between law and what is
properly prior to it.

4. THE NEED FOR THE PUBLIC SPHERE TO BE
DIVERSE AND THE RISK OF ASSUMED EVENTUAL
CONVERGENCE AND AGREEMENT
I have written in various ways elsewhere about the work of English philosopher
John Gray in relation to different versions of liberalism. Gray has identified
what he describes as a version of “liberalism” that poses a threat to genuine
liberalism because rather than endorsing living together with disagreement
(which Gray calls “modus vivendi”) there is a risk of moving towards “one size
fits all” or convergence (Benson 2008:298–299 citing Gray 2000:105). Gray
6

In a recent essay, in the same volume as that containing the article of the Chief
Justice discussed in this paper, William Galston succinctly sets out a history of the
development of the notion of political pluralism from Aristotle through Hobbes to
Rousseau and Rawls, showing the tensions between religious communities and
the developed principles of political pluralism (Galston 2004:41–50). He states:
“the common good of a pluralist society is not merely the aggregate of individual
or group interests, but it is not and must not be a comprehensive good either”
(Galston 2004:48) (emphasis in original).

7

Benson

Unexamined faiths and the public place of religion

says that the future of genuine liberalism will involve turning its face away from
the assumption that tolerance will eventually bring us all to agreement (using
law as the means of effecting convergence).
If one views this insight of John Gray against the conception of law put
forward in her McGill address by the Canadian Chief Justice, one can very
clearly see the same choice exists within law as within politics – between
“convergence” and “modus vivendi.”
What Gray says of liberalism applies to legal conceptions of “diversity”
and “equality” and I would like us to keep both political liberalism and legal
principles in mind as we consider the appropriate nature of religious inclusivity
in the public sphere. Canadian and South African jurisprudence tends to
favour both a religiously inclusivist conception of the public sphere (which
I shall discuss in a moment) and a plural conception of the public sphere
along the lines that Gray urges with reference to modus vivendi. Thus, the
Constitutional Court in the Fourie decision wrote that:
[T]here are a number of constitutional provisions that underline the
constitutional value of acknowledging diversity and pluralism in our
society, and give a particular texture to the broadly phrased right to
freedom of association contained in section 18. Taken together, they
affirm the right of people to self-expression without being forced to
subordinate themselves to the cultural and religious norms of others,
and highlight the importance of individuals and communities being able
to enjoy what has been called the ‘right to be different’. In each case,
space has been found for members of communities to depart from a
majoritarian norm.7

Canadian jurisprudence, as well, has acknowledged the concept of diversity
within the public sphere and the risk that rank-ordering would pose to sharing
that public space. Yet, as I shall argue below, some of the decisions themselves
seem to apply the very rank-ordering the Canadian Supreme Court has said
it wishes to avoid.
Thus, in the 1994 decision of Dagenais, then Chief Justice Lamer stated
that “When the protected rights of two individuals come into conflict...Charter
principles require a balance to be achieved that fully respects the importance
of both sets of rights.” 8 Similarly, in 2001 in a decision involving whether a
7

8

Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie (Doctors For Life International & Others, Amici
Curiae); Lesbian & Gay Equality Project & Others v Minister of Home Affairs 2006
(1) SA 524 (CC), 2006 (3) BCLR 355 (CC) (Fourie) at paras 60-61 per Sachs
J. This decision and the question of associational rights in general have been
addressed previously.
Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp. (1994) 3 S.C.R. 835, at para. 72.
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Christian University, Trinity Western, could maintain a Code of Conduct
banning certain conduct including sexual conduct, Justice Iacobbucci, in
giving the reasons of the Court, upholding the conduct clause, stated that:
“Neither freedom of religion nor the guarantee against discrimination based
on sexual orientation is absolute.”9
The theory, therefore, is one of sharing the public square. But is religion
“inside” the public or “outside” it? And is the public (including the State with
its law and politics) “inside” religions? This latter point is very important at a
time when some suggest that recourse to the courts ought to be the manner
in which dogmatic disputes within religious communities are sorted out if they
involve equality rights.

5. CHAMBERLAIN V. SURREY SCHOOL BOARD: THE
RE-UNDERSTANDING OF THE “SECULAR” IN
THE CONTEXT OF PUBLIC EDUCATION AND THE
PUBLIC SPHERE
The Supreme Court of Canada in a landmark decision without any parallel
in other jurisdictions, determined that the phrase “secular principles” and
therefore the term “secular” (the latter not mentioned in the Statute at issue)
must be understood to include religious citizens and not put them at any
disadvantage in relation to the public sphere in relation to those who are not
religious.
Mr. Justice Gonthier for himself and Justice Bastarache, who would
have upheld the British Columbia Court of Appeal’s decision on all points
and therefore wrote in dissent on part of the decision, said this about the
“secular”:
137 In my view, Saunders J. [the trial judge] below erred in her assumption
that “secular” effectively meant “non-religious”. This is incorrect since
nothing in the Charter, political or democratic theory, or a proper
understanding of pluralism demands that atheistically based moral
positions trump religiously based moral positions on matters of public
policy. I note that the preamble to the Charter itself establishes that “...
Canada is founded upon principles that recognize the supremacy of God
and the rule of law”. According to the reasoning espoused by Saunders
J., if one’s moral view manifests from a religiously grounded faith, it is
not to be heard in the public square, but if it does not, then it is publicly
acceptable. The problem with this approach is that everyone has “belief”
9

Trinity Western University v. British Columbia College of Teachers (2001) 1 S.C.R.
772 at para. 29.
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or “faith” in something, be it atheistic, agnostic or religious. To construe
the “secular” as the realm of the “unbelief” is therefore erroneous. Given
this, why, then, should the religiously informed conscience be placed at
a public disadvantage or disqualification? To do so would be to distort
liberal principles in an illiberal fashion and would provide only a feeble
notion of pluralism. The key is that people will disagree about important
issues, and such disagreement, where it does not imperil community
living, must be capable of being accommodated at the core of a modern
pluralism. (Emphasis added).10

Such an approach is at stark variance with the approaches taken by countries
such as France in which “strict separation” notions or ideas framed from
secularist presuppositions take the public realm in a very different direction
from the one being reached for in decisions like Chamberlain or Multani.
The Constitutional Court of South Africa came to a similar conclusion about
the public sphere though one might disagree with the placing of “sacred” and
“secular” in opposition in the way it is done in the passage that follows. In
Fourie a more careful and nuanced understanding of the public realm as a
sphere of “co-existence” is set out in the following passage from the judgment
of Sachs J. as follows:
In the open and democratic society contemplated by the Constitution
there must be mutually respectful co-existence between the secular
and the sacred. The function of the Court is to recognise the sphere
which each inhabits, not to force the one into the sphere of the other.
... The hallmark of an open and democratic society is its capacity to
accommodate and manage difference of intensely-held world views
and lifestyles in a reasonable and fair manner. The objective of the
Constitution is to allow different concepts about the nature of human
existence to inhabit the same public realm, and to do so in a manner
that is not mutually destructive and that at the same time enables
government to function in a way that shows equal concern and respect
for all. ... It is clear from the above that acknowledgment by the State
of the right of same-sex couples to enjoy the same status, entitlements
and responsibilities as marriage law accords to heterosexual couples
is in no way inconsistent with the rights of religious organisations to
continue to refuse to celebrate same-sex marriages. The constitutional
claims of same-sex couples can accordingly not be negated by invoking
the rights of believers to have their religious freedom respected. The two

10

Chamberlain v. Surrey Sch. Dist. No. 36, (2002) 4 S.C.R. 710, 749 (Can.) Chief
Justice McLachlin, who wrote the decision of the majority, accepted the reasoning
of Mr. Justice Gonthier on this point thus making his the reasoning of all nine
judges in relation to the interpretation of “secular.”
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sets of interests involved do not collide; they co-exist in a constitutional
realm based on accommodation of diversity.11

In line with the argument above, however, it would have been a better
description of the relationship between the state (law and politics) and the
religions and religious believers and their communities to have described
these as part of a co-operative relationship in which there is jurisdictional
separation but, as the passage correctly noted, co-operation within “the same
public realm.”
The characterization of the division in the above passage as “secular”
and “sacred” at the outset does not assist this later conceptualizing since,
for a religious citizen, the public order of the State, too, has its own sacred
dimension (everything within creation being, in a some sense, “Graced” or
“holy”) and such citizens are perfectly entitled to function fully within the public
sphere and be accommodated and offer others accommodation there.
In fact, if we wish those who hold public office or positions to act
conscientiously, and their consciences are formed by their beliefs and their
beliefs may well be informed by what they believe to be true about religion
(how can they not?) then such public officials must necessarily bring their
religious beliefs into the public sphere with them.
We cannot properly seek to have conscientious public officials whom we
urge to act differently than their religions dictate when they are at work. That
is why the principle of accommodation exists: because we do not (except
in unusual circumstances) want to force people to leave their beliefs at
their work-place doors. To argue the opposite is to set the groundwork for a
requirement of public hypocrisy. Hardly the thing most people would want who
recognize the link many people have (see the quotation at the outset of this
paper) between their religious beliefs and their ideas of right and wrong.
If we imagine the accommodation of religious clothing (or such religious
or cultural indicators as the nose-ring in Pillay,12 or the wearing of a kirpan in
Multani,13 or the erection of suchots on a condominium balcony in Amselem
11

12
13

Fourie, above, at para’s 94 – 98 emphasis added. Justice Sach’s conception of
differing beliefs co-existing within the public realm is of signal importance and
sets the stage, along with the approach of Justice Gonthier in Chamberlain, for a
redefinition or, better yet, re-understanding of what might be termed central public
terminology.
KwaZulu-Natal MEC for Education v Pillay 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC).
Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys (2006) 1 SCR 256, 2006
SCC 6 (wearing of Kirpan in public school allowed, on the basis of freedom of
religion; absolute ban overturned). For a comment on this decision see Lauwers
and Benson (2006).
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etc.) we see that accommodation is a necessary aspect of life in community
(which has public and private dimensions). Where the personal is political
the personal religious is in the public political; it will always be a question of
principled accommodation not simple exclusion; the co-operation of religious
belief and public systems not, as it is sometimes mis-formulated, the “strict
separation” of the two.

6. THE PUBLIC SPHERE BEST UNDERSTOOD AS A
REALM OF COMPETING BELIEF SYSTEMS
As already argued, the public might best be understood as a realm of
competing belief systems. The public university, therefore, is a microcosm
of the wider public realm and must also understand itself as partaking of this
elemental belief competition.
It is better to simply say and make clear that the public realm includes
believers of all sorts whether atheist, agnostic or religious and the role of
the law when certain types of conflicts emerge is to order or reconcile the
relationships according to the principles of justice, trying wherever possible
to give maximum scope to religious association and participation rather than
taking a crabbed and narrow approach.
It is often the case that when most people use the term “secular” they
mean “public” and it would aid clear thinking in this area if that term was used
in the future.
What we have most recently in this emerging area are general guidelines
allowing maximal scope for judicial development. The Supreme Court of
Canada, as already referred to, has made it clear that it wishes to, in principle,
avoid rank-ordering rights.14 Is this agnosticism, about which rights are
weightier than others, sustainable? Is it wise? More importantly, is it real?
In a recent decision from the Canadian Supreme Court touching upon the
freedom of religion in relation to civil laws, the majority judgment began by
affirming that multi-culturalism and pluralism must be protected but noting the
fact-specific and nuanced application that defies “bright-line application”:
Canada rightly prides itself on its evolutionary tolerance for diversity
and pluralism. This journey has included a growing appreciation for
multiculturalism, including the recognition that ethnic, religious or
cultural differences will be acknowledged and respected. Endorsed in
legal instruments ranging from the statutory protections found in human
rights codes to their constitutional enshrinement in the Canadian
14

See the decisions of Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp and Trinity Western
University v. British Columbia College of Teachers at footnotes 8 and 9 above.
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Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the right to integrate into Canada’s
mainstream based on and notwithstanding these differences has
become a defining part of our national character.

The right to have differences protected, however, does not mean that those
differences are always hegemonic. Not all differences are compatible with
Canada’s fundamental values and, accordingly, not all barriers to their
expression are arbitrary. Determining when the assertion of a right based
on difference must yield to a more pressing public interest is a complex,
nuanced, fact-specific exercise that defies bright-line application. It is, at the
same time, a delicate necessity for protecting the evolutionary integrity of both
multiculturalism and public confidence in its importance.15
Many of the dualisms touched upon cause a great deal of confusion and run
against the principles of inclusion, diversity, respect and accommodation that
constitutional legal cultues claim to recognize and seek to protect. We should
be careful not to bleach diversity out of the public sphere by force of judicial
pronouncement or legislation. Inappropriate bleaching occurs, for example,
where there is said to be, impilcity or explicitly, “one” conception of marriage
or male and female relationships or views about abortion as having singular
“public” aspects that admit of no dissent. Accommodation protects not only
the ability to express a view but the ability to, in acceptable ways, dissent and
give withness by doing so. Dissent can be one of the most effective means of
furthering justice – as the history of struggles for such things as civil rights in
various countries shows quite clearly.
A variety of viewpoints are publically acceptable where matters have not
been closed off (such as they have been in the case of racism but even there
most cultures would still allow people to speak publicly in favour of what is
unpopular up until the point that it offends public morals or peace and order).
In fact, the more important a debate is for the public the more likely it is that
differing viewpoints will excite passionate responses. For example, labour
relations laws have long recognized that such matters as strikes or lock-outs
frequently cause disputes, sometimes vociferous but the possibility of passions
and violence provide no pre-emptive power to foreclose debates that may
lead to violence. In morally contested areas, we must encourage civil debate
and open expression as means of furthering greater understanding between
citizens.
Thus, the public sphere should be understood as inclusive of all sorts of
belief systems (whether atheist, agnostic or religious) rather than a-religiously
“secular” (when by “secular” we mean “stripped of religion”); when the
15

Bruker v. Marcovitz, 2007 SCC 54 para’s 1-2. See also Boonstra and Benson
(2008).
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issue is accommodation we ought not to be too concerned about minority/
majority viewpoints – and certainly not as a requirement for there to be
accommodation.

7. CONCLUSION
To wrap up the various themes of this article: we have seen that it is important
to recognize that there are unexamined faiths. This is important in order to
properly discuss the public place of religion alongside other, non-religious,
beliefs in the public sphere. In fact, this recognition is of pivotal importance.
The article also discussed that what we mean by “faith” and “belief”; how
we conceive of the nature of the “public”; and how we understand the role
of “law” itself, are all of fundamental importance to properly analyzing cases
involving the freedom of religion.
The largely unrecognized (it must be said) reconfiguration of the meaning
of “secular” in the Chamberlain decision from Canada’s highest court heralds
a better direction for religious inclusivity. Its philosophical accuracy (with
respect to the understanding of “secular” as religiously inclusive) commends it
for application in other countries.
Many challenges on University campuses today proceed without an
awareness of the need to recognize the public place of religion and the need
for accommodation.
In some cases where accommodation of individual or associational beliefs
is not respected and is pushed in the direction of what this paper has described,
for shorthand, “one size fits all” we see a failure to instantiate an appropriate
modus vivendi. Part of the reason for this may well be the “unexamined faiths”
the article has sought to clarify (including the misuse of “secular” and “neutral”
in relation to the public sphere).
The article has, it is hoped, demonstrated that how we approach key
terms goes a long way to what sort of outcomes we can expect in relation
to the freedom of religion and the sharing of the public square in all its public
dimensions including universities.
One aspect of this terminological clarification is to demonstrate that faith
and belief are not simply other words for “religion” and that many of those
who believe they possess “no faith” do – they just believe differently and have
different “faiths” than other people. These beliefs are often “unexamined” and
some of the terms used contain “hidden meanings”16 that need to be made
16

For a discussion of Owen Barfield`s concept of “hidden meanings” in relation
to the “secular” and alternative theological conceptions of time in relation to

14

Acta Theologica Supplementum 14

2011

visible. Furthermore, belief in agnostic or atheist assumptions should give no
greater access or privilege in the public sphere in such areas as access or
funding and the law must not, by inflating its own role, put added pressures on
the liberty that subsidiarity requires for the freedoms of associations and the
human person to provide genuine alternatives for the exercise of choices and
the performances of projects in free and democratic societies.
One further point should be made in conclusion. The affirmation of diversity
does not mean that there cannot be any shared programs for civics so as to
bolster citizenship and the common good. Thus, to give one example, in the
area of public education, a very carefully crafted program on “civics” containing
certain minimal requirements for civic recognitions and legal principles of nondiscrimination (properly presented) might well be required by the State as the
quid pro quo for public funding. Such programs and regulations, however,
must be very carefully drawn so as not to smuggle in, say, merit claims about
religion (“these religions are all the same”) under the rubric of neutrality and
“teaching about religions.”
Courses on civics and citizenship including an ethical component
(teaching, for example, the golden rule of “do to others what you would like
them to do to you”) are important. The key to the wide acceptance of such
programs, however, is not just the course content and how sensitively they
are delivered but what scope they allow for the proper recognition of diversity
in implementation and allowance of exemptions or alternative means of
delivery.
The state may well be entitled to develop a course on ethics and religions
but in doing so it must be careful not to make the all too easy claim (especially
in relation to religions) that they are all practically equivalent for that itself is a
claim about the merits of religions and that is not a valid use of state powers.
With respect to religious education outside of a religious or denominational
setting, therefore, greater attention should be given to protect the principle
that parents are the primary educators of their children and thus delegate this
to the state.17
Parental delegation contains within it the right of dissent when the state
introduces programs that go against parental beliefs. What may seem “neutral”
and reasonable to education authorities may not seem so to parents or their
religious communities. Practical accommodation will be an exercise in finetuning that attempts to reconcile differing viewpoints to the greatest extent

17

understandings of the “secular”, see Benson (2002:125-139).
R.v. Audet, [1996] 2. S.C.R. 171 (S.C.C.) where the Supreme Court of Canada
recognized that parents delegate their primary authority over education to the
state.
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possible while acknowledging that neither the claims of parents nor state
educators are absolute.
When objections are raised, one way to deal with them might be to clarify
the state objectives (such as knowing the basic teachings of other religions)
without making the claims about the religions which parents find objectionable.
This would enable state educational authorities the ability to examine on the
subject matter without getting “inside” the claims about religions that have
been found objectionable. A simpler solution, though it lacks the substantive
state goals of exposure to other traditions would be to exempt the student
from that part of the curriculum that is offensive to parents. In an integrated
curriculum setting (for it may be that objections are towards the religious
education component in a denominational setting) the only solution might be
to find another sort of schooling since parsing out what is religious and nonreligious may prove impossible or unworkable for educational authorities.
Alternatively, as suggested, other means (most likely parental) might
be found to teach towards the state goals but within the moral and religious
framework of parents and their communities. Given that home-education
is allowed in most jurisdictions, and that is a complete removal from state
education in all but the examinations, it is not reasonable to claim, as some
do, that this sort of accommodation threatens state education. Means of
examination as to substance (but not merits) of other religions could be found
if it is the substance that concerns the state. These alternatives may not be
acceptable to those who wish greater public control and uniformity but it is the
price to be paid for the maintenance of freedoms and diversity in mulit-cultural
and plural societies. Flexibility in relation to the ordered principles of civil
society (such as parental delegation and state requirements for citizenship)
is important and maximum attention to alternative delivery and exemptions
are key.18

18

A case coming before the Supreme Court of Canada, (May 2011) Lavellée and
Jutras v. Commission Scholaire des Chênes et Procureur Général du Québec,
2009 QCCS 3875; appeal refused, 2010 QCCA 346 raises these sorts of concerns.
There the Quebec government introduced a mandatory course on ethics and
religion and refused to exempt over 2,000 (Roman Catholic) parents who sought
exemption from the public school course on conscience and religious grounds.
The parent’s lost both at trial and before the Quebec Court of Appeal. In a parallel
proceeding involving a Catholic Jesuit High School (state-funded) a trial judge
overturned the Province’s refusal to grant exemption (Loyola High School et al. v.
Courchesne et al. 2010 QCCS 2631, June 18, 2010 see: http://www.jugements.
qc.ca/php/decision.php?liste=46252591&doc=7FF18D89A2AE5ADB9810CF4B
60DAFDFCF774F8F11CE85819B903D21A6CECE9FD&page=1, last accessed
February 28, 2011). At the time of this writing the parents’ case alone is proceeding
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